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Prolonging of Spectrum Exhaust 
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 Abstract: In this article, we show how the Federal Communications 
Commission’s regulatory process may be used by special interests (and the 
Agency) to impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for 
commercial spectrum.  In particular, we show that imposing (and threatening 
to impose) significant conditions when firms seek to repurpose spectrum 
from a low-value to a higher-value use acts as a “tax” and thus reduces the 
incentives of firms to exchange spectrum in the secondary market.  As a 
result, “taxation by condition” will discourage the larger scale transactions 
necessary to resolve the acknowledged spectrum shortages in the 
commercial mobile wireless industry, though we may still observe many 
deals of a less material nature that will attract less attention and thus fewer 
conditions.  Our analysis also reveals that in many cases the arguments to 
condition spectrum licenses based on “market power” concerns are 
misguided.  Market power does not over-motivate licensees to repurpose 
spectrum.  In fact, economic theory shows that a monopolist will repurpose 
spectrum to a degree less than or equal to a benevolent “social 
planner.”  Accordingly, under the threat of a spectrum shortage, “taxing” 
efforts to repurpose spectrum is perhaps the worst of all policies. 
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I. Introduction 
While offering great promise for increased innovation, efficiency, and 
economic growth, the mobile revolution is threatened today by the lack of 
sufficient commercial spectrum to satiate America’s ever-increasing appetite 
for wireless devices.  Indeed, the National Broadband Plan, released in 
2010, concluded that the present inventory of commercial spectrum 
represents just a fraction of the amount necessary to serve a rapidly growing 
demand for mobile data.1  While efforts are underway to hold voluntary 
 
 1.   FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 75 
(2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296935A1.pdf 
(hereinafter the National Broadband Plan); see also Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Election 
Comm’n, Prepared Remarks for 2011 International Consumer Electronics Show, Las Vegas, NV 
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incentive auctions for broadcast spectrum 2  and to free up unused or 
underutilized government spectrum,3 most agree that these initiatives are 
years away from putting spectrum in the hands of commercial users and 
will be insufficient standing alone to resolve spectrum exhaust even if fully 
successful.4  As a result, the spectrum community is now exploring ways to 
repurpose spectrum from lower to higher valued uses to satisfy the growing 
demand. 5   For example, we have recently seen activity involving the 
conversion of spectrum currently used for Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) to 
terrestrial use, 6  the acquisition and conversion of WCS spectrum to 
 
(Jan. 7, 2011), available at  http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
303984A1.pdf); Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President Obama 
Details Plan to Win the Future through Expanded Wireless Access (Feb. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/president-obama-details-plan-win-future- 
through-expanded-wireless-access; T. Randolph Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under 
Spectrum Exhaust, 65 FED. COMM. L. J. 79 (2012); L. Strickland, AWS-3 Auction Highlights New 
Approach to Spectrum Policy, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. Blog (Jan. 29, 2015), available at 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/aws-3-auction-highlights-new-approach-spectrum-policy; 
Jeff Kagan, Wireless Spectrum Shortage Growing, RCR WIRELESS (Jun. 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150615/opinion/spectrum-shortage-problem-needs-solution; Jason 
Furman and Megan Smith, How to Avoid Spectrum Crunch, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015), available 
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/jason-furman-and-megan-smith-how-to-avoid-spectrum- crunch-
1421970841. 
 2.  Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat 156. 
 3.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT — PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:  REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF 
GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH (July 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final_july_
20_2012.pdf.  
 4.  See, e.g., Id.; NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., PLAN AND TIMETABLE TO MAKE 
AVAILABLE 500 MEGAHERTZ OF SPECTRUM FOR WIRELESS BROADBAND (Oct. 2010), available 
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/tenyearplan_11152010.pdf. 
 5.  In fact, some argue that spectrum exhaust is not so much about a shortage of spectrum as 
it is about a profoundly inefficient allocation of spectrum resources.  See, e.g., J. Bazinet and M. 
Rollins, Wireless Supply and Demand, CITI EQUITIES (Sept. 22, 2011). 
 6.  In the Matter of Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2000-2020 MHz and 
2180-2200 MHz Bands Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at 1525-
1559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and 2000-2020 
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz, 
1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands, FCC 12-151, REPORT AND ORDER 
AND ORDER OF PROPOSED MODIFICATION, 27 FCC Rcd. 16102 (rel. Dec. 17, 2012) (hereinafter 
“MSS Order”). 
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commercial use,7 and the transfer of idle spectrum licensed to the cable 
industry to a mobile broadband provider.8 
Unfortunately, repurposing spectrum (either using intra- or inter-firm 
transfers) is easier said than done.  While the private sector is attempting to 
identify and repurpose spectrum to high–value commercial uses, all such 
repurposing requires government approval.  As history bears out, this 
regulatory approval process is far from streamlined; instead, both the 
government and the applicants’ competitors often use the regulatory process 
to garner concessions that they would not otherwise be able to obtain in the 
normal course of business.9   As we show in this article, the regulatory 
process essentially acts as a “tax” on private transactions in the form of 
value-extracting mandatory and voluntary conditions, which in turn, affect 
the evolution of and efficient functioning of a secondary market for 
commercial spectrum.  In so doing, “taxation by condition” will discourage 
the larger scale transactions necessary to resolve spectrum exhaust from 
arising, though we may still observe many deals of a less material nature that 
attract less attention and thus fewer conditions. 
To explore this important issue in more detail, in this article we evaluate 
the effect of this “tax” on the incentives for private entities to transfer 
spectrum resources from lower to higher-valued uses.  Our analysis is 
somewhat abstract, but our basic conclusions are both simple and of great 
practical significance. 
 
 7.  In the matter of Applications of AT&T Mobility Spectrum LLC, New Cingular Wireless 
PCS, LLC, Comcast Corporation, Horizon Wi-Com, LLC, Nextwave Wireless, Inc., and San Diego 
Gas & Electric Company for Consent to Assign and Transfer Licenses, FCC 12-156 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, 27 FCC Rcd. 16459 (rel. Dec. 18, 2012); see also J. Crook, 
AT&T Acquires NextWave (And Its WCS Spectrum) For Up to $50M To Build Out 4G 
LTE Network, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/02/att- 
acquires-nextwave-and-its-wcs-spectrum-for-25m-to-build-out-4g-lte-network. 
 8.  In the Matter of Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and 
SpectrumCo LLC and Cox TMI, LLC For Consent To Assign AWS-1 Licenses Applications of 
Verizon Wireless and Leap for Consent To Exchange Lower 700 MHz, AWS-1, and PCS Licenses 
Applications of T-Mobile License LLC and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless for Consent 
to Assign Licenses, FCC 12-95, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AND DECLARATORY 
RULING, 27 FCC Rcd. 12154 (rel. Aug. 23, 2012). 
 9.  See Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC 
Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of The “Public Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 329 (2010); T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak and Michael 
Stern, Eroding the Rule of Law: Regulation as Cooperative Bargaining at the FCC, PHOENIX 
CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 49 (2015), available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/ 
PCPP49Final.pdf. 
3 BEARD ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NN_NW_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
SUMMER 2016] TAXATION BY CONDITION 187 
 
For example, we show that the practice of conditioning (and threatening 
to condition) spectrum repurposing impedes such activity and interferes with 
the development of a vibrant secondary market.  Conditions are a form of a 
tax, and basic economic logic tells us that taxes reduce the incentive to make 
transactions.  Likewise, prolonged delays on requests to repurpose spectrum 
also operate as a tax on transactions.  Equally as important, we show that 
when spectrum has a higher value in some different use, both the private firm 
and the social planner want to reallocate spectrum to the higher value use.  
Economic theory also shows that a monopolist will seek to reallocate an 
amount of spectrum less than or equal to that of a benevolent regulator (i.e., 
a welfare-maximizing social planner).  The difference is attributable to the 
fact that the social planner’s decisions are based on total surplus, while the 
monopolist is motivated only by profits.  Nevertheless, under some 
conditions, the monopolist and the social planner make the same decisions.  
Accordingly, our analysis suggests that arguments to “tax” (or outright 
prohibit) such efforts to acquire and repurpose spectrum based on simplistic 
“market power” concerns are misguided.  Our model suggests that market 
power does not provide an incentive to repurpose “too much” spectrum from 
a social perspective. 
The policy implications of our work are clear:  If the FCC wants to 
alleviate spectrum shortages and to encourage the facilitation of a secondary 
market for spectrum licenses, then “taxing” efforts to repurpose spectrum to 
higher valued uses like mobile data in the form of license conditions is 
perhaps the worst of all policies.  Instead, barring legitimate competitive or 
interference concerns, efforts to repurpose spectrum from low- to high-value 
uses should be expeditiously approved without extraneous conditions.  
Moreover, regardless of the Commission’s (or other’s) social goals (e.g., 
universal broadband), the costly and often implicit restrictions on trading 
spectrum rights are an enormously bad way to achieve those objectives.  This 
strong conclusion is a direct consequence of the economic implications of 
the agency’s conditioning approach, which amounts to a form of taxation 
that applies only to repurposing of spectrum that increase the market value 
of the spectrum resource.  That is, the agency is taxing only those 
transactions that create enough value to manifest as a transaction. 
Our article is outlined as follows.  In Section II, we discuss a recent 
proceeding before the FCC involving a license repurposing to illustrate 
efforts by private interests to “tax” secondary market transactions where a 
party is seeking to move spectrum from low to higher value uses, namely 
DISH’s efforts to repurpose spectrum used for Mobile Satellite Service 
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(MSS) to terrestrial commercial use.10  Although the FCC, to its credit, 
ultimately rejected such proposals, this proceeding provides a useful case 
study to illustrate many of the common landmines involved with efforts to 
repurpose spectrum.  In Section III, we provide an economic framework to 
evaluate the effect of proposed “taxes” on spectrum transactions.  As we 
show, the types of taxes proposed by both the government and private sector 
entities alike interfere with private efforts to reduce spectrum congestion and 
impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for commercial 
spectrum, which in turn, harms overall welfare.  Policy implications and 
conclusions are contained in the final two sections of the paper. 
II. “Taxing” Spectrum Repurposing Case Study:  The Mobile 
Satellite Service Proceeding 
As noted above, our purpose in this article is to contemplate why a large-
scale secondary market in the U.S. has been so slow to develop despite the 
obvious need to reallocate spectrum resources to higher valued uses.11  By any 
measure, too much spectrum — both government and commercial — 
remains unused or underutilized.  Since all secondary market transactions 
and adjustments to existing licenses require FCC’s review and approval, it is 
sensible to look at the review process as a possible source of dysfunction.  
To do so, we examine the most basic problem of allocating a finite amount 
of spectrum between two economic markets, A and B.  Such repurposing 
requires FCC’s approval, and history shows that the approval process is rife 
with rent seeking activity that sometimes results in the levying of a “tax” on 
the transaction by the Commission in the form of costly conditions, if they 
grant it at all.12   As such, we study the implication of such tax on the 
repurposing spectrum, and reveal how such interventions impede the 
development of (and the nature of) a large-scale secondary market for 
spectrum. 
Prior to the theoretical analysis, we set the stage for the theory with a 
case study of spectrum repurposing and reassignment.  Fortunately, we are 
 
 10.  MSS Order, supra note 6. 
 11.  See, e.g., John W. Mayo & Scott Wallsten, Enabling Efficient Wireless Communications:  
The Role of Secondary Spectrum Markets, 22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 61–72 (2010); Jeffrey A. Eisenach 
and Hall J. Singer, Avoiding Rent-Seeking in Secondary Market Spectrum Transactions, 65 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 261–96 (2013), available at http://www.fclj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/65-3-
Singer.pdf); Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, and Rakesh Vohra, Spectrum Markets: Motivation, 
Challenges, and Implications, 48 COMM. MAG., IEEE 146–155 (2010). 
 12.  See, e.g., Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 11; Eisenach & Singer, supra note 11; Koutsky 
& Spiwak, supra note 9; Beard, et al., Eroding the Rule of Law, supra note 9. 
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presented with an excellent case study in the current debate — i.e., the FCC’s 
recent experience with repurposing spectrum formally assigned for Mobile 
Satellite Service in the 2000-2020 MHz band and 2180-2200 MHz bands 
(hereinafter “S-Band”) to terrestrial commercial use.13  Making a very long 
and complicated story short, as the name implies, MSS spectrum was 
originally intended for a mobile communications service provided by 
satellites.  Despite significant early interest, the service was not 
economically viable and eventually all MSS providers went bankrupt and 
out of business.14  In 2011, DISH Network Corporation (DISH) received 
approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York to acquire 40 MHz of MSS spectrum in the 2 GHz band 
(hereinafter, the “AWS-4” spectrum) for approximately $3 billion15 with the 
stated goal of repurposing this spectrum to try to build a new nationwide 
LTE network.16  Recognizing the important potential for this MSS spectrum 
to be converted for terrestrial commercial use,17 in March 2012 the FCC 
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to do just that. 18   Despite the 
 
 13.  MSS Order, supra note 6. 
 14.  See In the Matter of Serv. Rules for Advanced Wireless Servs. in the 2000-2020 Mhz & 
2180-2200 Mhz Bands, 27 FCC Rcd. 3561 (2012) (hereinafter MSS NPRM) at ¶¶ 3-9 (Significantly, 
the agency’s own Bureau Chiefs recognized in the Harbinger Order that the primary reason why 
no “next generation” MSS services exist yet is because MSS companies have had to change 
constantly “their plans over the past years, both in response to changing economic times and to 
changes in Commission rules”); In the Matter of Skyterra Commc’ns, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd. 3059, 3085 
at ¶ 54 (2010) (hereinafter Harbinger Order). 
 15.  See Greg Avery, Dish’s Plan for TerreStar Nework gets Judge’s Approval, DENVER BUS. 
J. (Feb. 16, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2012/ 
02/dishs-plan-for-terrestar-network-gets.html; In the Matter of Dbsd N. Am., Inc., Debtor-in-
Possession; New Dbsd Satellite Servs. G.P., Debtor-in-Possession; Pendrell Corp., Transferor; & 
Terrestar License Inc., Debtor-in-Possession; Assignor, & Dish Network Corp., Transferee; & 
Gamma Acquisition L.L.C.; Assignee in the Matters of New Dbsd Satellite Servs. G.P., Debtor-in-
Possession Terrestar Licensee Inc., Debtor-in-Possession, 27 FCC Rcd. 2250, 2250 (2012) (On 
Mar. 2, 2012, the Int’l Bureau granted the applications for transfer of control of the DBSD and 
TerreStar licenses to DISH) (hereinafter DISH Transfer Order); Id. at ¶ 29 (In doing so, the Bureau 
denied DISH’s request for waivers to allow terrestrial use of the AWS-4 spectrum, preferring the 
“rulemaking approach.”).  
 16.  Greg Avery, Dish’s Plan for TerreStar Network gets Judge’s Approval, DENVER BUS. J.  
(Feb. 16, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2012/02/dishs-
plan-for-terrestar-network-gets.html (quoting DISH’s press release “Dish would immediately begin 
the design and construction planning for the nation’s first 100 percent LTE network”). 
 17.  See Fed. Commc’s Comm’n, National Broadband Plan, supra note 1, at 87 (“The FCC 
should build on past efforts to enable terrestrial deployment in MSS bands.  The MSS allocation 
consists of a significant amount of bandwidth with propagation characteristics suitable for mobile 
broadband.”) 
 18.  MSS NPRM, supra note 14. 
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Commission’s own repeated calls for prompt action to transition the AWS-
4 spectrum to terrestrial use, it took the Commission seven months after 
DISH sought the license transfers (in 2011) to initiate the rulemaking.19  The 
Agency’s final decision would come nine months later in December 2012.20  
While sixteen months is hardly expeditious, the unconditioned grant of the 
transfer is a model of future actions on spectrum transfers. 
A review of the record in this proceeding reveals that both the 
Commission and various special interests had proposed a number of costly 
conditions and spectrum encumbrances on the transaction.  These proposed 
conditions were, in many cases, quite harsh and would be expected to reduce 
substantially the value of the transaction to DISH, in the same way a tax on 
the transaction would reduce value.21  In the MSS NPRM, for example, these 
proposed conditions included, but were not limited to, the following:22 
A. Build-out Requirements and Forfeiture Penalties 
Even though DISH has proposed to transfer spectrum to the capacity-
constrained mobile broadband market, where spectrum is highly sought after 
by regulators and policymakers generally, the Commission had proposed to 
impose the following stringent build-out requirements on DISH as a 
precondition of repurposing the spectrum: 
 
 19.  See DISH Network Corporation Files to Acquire Control of Licenses and Authorizations 
Held By New DBSD Satellite Services G.P, Debtor-in-Possession and TerreStar License Inc., 
Debtor-in-Possession, IB Docket No. 11150, Public Notice, 26 FCC Rcd. 13018, 13020-1 (2011) 
(DBSD and TerreStar Transfer of Control Public Notice).  National Broadband Plan, supra note 
1, Recommendation 5.8.4, Exhibit 5E.   
 20.  MSS Order, supra note 6.   
 21.  To see the “tax” analogy more clearly, assume that in an unregulated state the value of 
the deal to DISH is V.  Conditions on the deal are costly (the cost of which are labeled C), so if the 
FCC imposes some or all of the proposed conditions on the transfer, then the value of the transfer 
is V - C, where C is positive.  Likewise, if the FCC imposed a “deal tax” of T, the value of the 
transaction would be V – T.  Or, say that the conditions extract proportion t of the total value V, so 
that C = tV.  If so, DISH receives only V(1 - t) of the total value.  Plainly, the conditions placed on 
spectrum reallocations may be viewed as a tax (with tax rate T or t). 
 22.  Indeed, while we use the MSS proceeding as a case study, we have seen many of these 
exact types of “taxes” raised in other secondary market transactions.  See, e.g., Public Knowledge, 
AT&T Spectrum Deals Demonstrate Broken Spectrum Policy (Aug. 2, 2012) (“. . . the FCC needs 
to adopt build-out policies that discourage speculation, and ‘use it or share it’ policies that allow 
for unlicensed use of fallow spectrum.  Finally, the FCC needs to update its spectrum screen to 
discourage the same few companies from acquiring more and more of this vital resource”), 
available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/broken-spectrum-policy; see also T. R. Beard, G. S. 
Ford, L. J. Spiwak and M. Stern, A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile 
Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 693 (2011). 
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 Within three years, DISH shall provide signal coverage and offer 
service to at least thirty percent of their total AWS-4 population.  
DISH’s total AWS-4 population shall be calculated by summing the 
population of each of its license authorizations in the AWS-4 band (the 
“Interim Build-Out Requirement”); and 
 Within seven years, DISH shall provide signal coverage and offer 
service to at least seventy percent of the population in each of its license 
authorization areas (the “Final Build-Out Requirement”).23 
In addition to these stringent build-out requirements, the Commission 
proposed aggressive penalties should DISH fail to meet these requirements.  
Specifically: 
 In the event DISH fails to meet the AWS-4 Interim Build-Out 
Requirement, “all of the licensee’s AWS-4 license authorizations shall 
terminate automatically without Commission action” (emphasis in 
original); and 
 In the event DISH fails to meet the AWS-4 Final Build-Out 
Requirement in any of its license authorizations, its AWS-4 license for 
each license authorization areas in which it fails to meet the build-out 
requirement shall terminate automatically without Commission 
action.24 
These penalties were quite severe.  As explained by the Commission, DISH’s 
“failure to meet the AWS-4 Interim Build-out Requirement would result in 
the AWS-4 and 2 GHz MSS licenses automatically terminating in all license 
areas (i.e., nationwide).”25   In other words, if DISH failed to meet the 
requirements, it would lose its licenses in an automatic termination.  And as 
if this was not enough, not only would its “terrestrial spectrum rights would 
become available for reassignment pursuant to the competitive bidding,” but 
DISH “would be precluded from regaining” these rights in the future.26  
Plainly, by accelerating the cost of entry in an already competitive market, 
build-out conditions can be expected to discourage spectrum holders to enter 
the secondary market. 27   While there may be legitimate reasons for 
 
 23.  MSS NPRM, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 92-93. 
 24.  Id. at ¶ 94. 
 25.  Id. at ¶ 95 (emphasis added). 
 26.  Id. at ¶ 96. 
 27.  See, e.g., George S. Ford, et al., The Economics of Build-Out Rules in Cable Television, 
28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 207 (2006); Thomas W. Hazlett & George S. Ford, The Fallacy 
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encouraging the use of spectrum resources sooner rather than later, a build-
out requirement that is overly aggressive will discourage the transfer of 
spectrum to higher valued uses, especially if the lower valued use has a more 
lax build-out rule. 
B.  Mandatory Wholesale Requirements 
Several commenters argued that the Commission should force DISH to 
“make available a minimum portion of their spectrum capacity at wholesale 
rates.”  Some commenters left the determination of “minimum portion” up 
to the Commission.28  Others argued that DISH should make up to fifty 
percent of capacity in each economic area available for wholesale leasing.29  
Regardless of the size of the potential set-aside, however, such mandatory 
wholesale requirements would reduce the value of the spectrum. 
C.  Restrictions on Wholesale Capacity 
Not content with having the Commission force DISH to carve out a 
portion of its spectrum for wholesale use, some commenters wanted the 
Commission to impose conditions on how DISH could resell this wholesale 
capacity.  For example, several commenters argued that DISH must obtain 
prior FCC approval before entering into any wholesale agreement for more 
than a “substantial percentage” (i.e., twenty-five percent) of the total traffic 
carried over DISH’s terrestrial network.  Some commenters would limit this 
preapproval requirement only to cases involving the two largest CMRS 
providers (i.e., AT&T and Verizon)30; others would apply this provision to 
any CMRS carrier.31  However, one commenter (RCA) asked that DISH not 
be allowed to enter into any agreement — no matter how large or small — 
with AT&T or Verizon without prior FCC approval.32  Such constraints on 
the post-transfer business plan obviously reduce the value of the spectrum 
repurposing. 
 
of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the Level Playing Field in Cable TV Franchising 
Statutes, 3 BUS. & POL. 21 (2001). 
 28.  RCA Comments to the MSS NPRM at ¶ 4. 
 29.  New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 8–9. 
 30.  New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 11–13. 
 31.  T-Mobile Comments to the MSS NPRM at 16–17. 
 32.  RCA Comments in the MSS NPRM at 7.  We note that this type of “voluntary 
commitment” was also imposed in the Harbinger Order, supra note 14, albeit with both 
questionable societal benefits, T. R. Beard et al., A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in 
Mobile Communications, supra note 22, as well as significant due process questions.  G.S. Ford, 
L. J. Spiwak & M. Stern, The Broadband Credibility Gap, 19 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 75 (2010). 
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D.  Resale “Flipping” Restrictions 
Because DISH did not purchase the MSS spectrum at auction but rather 
out of bankruptcy from the original licensees, several parties argued that 
repurposing the MSS for terrestrial commercial use will somehow result in 
a “windfall” and “unjustly enrich” DISH.  (As noted above, DISH paid $3 
billion for the licenses.)  Accordingly, several commenters argued that if 
DISH “flips” the spectrum within a five year period to an incumbent CMRS 
provider, then the FCC should impose an “unjust enrichment penalty” 
similar to the penalties imposed for designated entity bidding.33 
E.  “Spectrum Squatting” 
One of the more interesting proposed conditions was what we can best 
describe as “spectrum squatting” — that is, the FCC should only grant the 
AWS-4 license on the condition that DISH make any fallow spectrum 
available for “temporary shared access” through the TV bands data base until 
such time as DISH commences actual service in a geographic area.34 
F. Reauction of Spectrum Already Paid for in the Commercial Secondary 
Market 
Not to be outdone, several commenters argued that DISH should not be 
entitled to use all of the spectrum it bought out of bankruptcy.  For example, 
several commenters argued that Commission should simply take back 20 
MHz of the 40 MHZ of MSS spectrum purchased for reauction via 
competitive bidding.35  In fact, one commenter even went so far as to argue 
that the Commission should seize 30 MHz (a whopping three quarters of the 
total capacity at issue in the MSS NPRM) in the top one hundred 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas for competitive bidding.36 
G. Changes in Band Plan for Already Acquired Spectrum 
Finally, there were proposals to alter the 2 GHz band plan altogether and 
shift DISH’s spectrum up 5 MHz, as well as other proposals to modify the 2 
 
 33.  New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 18; RCA Comments in the MSS 
NPRM at 11. 
 34.  New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 13. 
 35.  T-Mobile Comments to the MSS NPRM at 17; Metro PCS Comments in the MSS NPRM 
at 30. 
 36.  Metro PCS Comments to the MSS NPRM at 32–33. 
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GHz band.37  In particular, although DISH acquired a specific 40 MHz of 
spectrum in the secondary market, some parties nonetheless wanted the 
Commission unilaterally change DISH’s spectrum holdings in the MSS 
proceeding.  There was some debate in the proceeding as to whether or not 
interference or other considerations warrant the modification,38 but the 
relevant issue (as we see it) was the settled expectations of a buyer of spectrum 
in the secondary market.  DISH had invested billions of dollars to acquire 
AWS-4 spectrum and satellites that DISH asserts will only operate on the 
specific 40 MHz of AWS-4 spectrum.39  According to DISH, this investment 
was based, in part, on the attractiveness of this spectrum for global 
harmonization and the significant development work already completed to 
transition this spectrum for mobile broadband use.40  Specifically, standard 
setting groups had been working since 2009 on the standards necessary to 
provide for handset standards, filter design, and other technology 
advancements necessary to rollout services for the AWS-4 spectrum.41  A 
change in the band plan at this late date might have required an entirely new 
standard setting process and delay service to consumers for years with 
obvious potential impact on the value of this spectrum. 
H.  Summary:  Paying the “Vig”42 
Plainly, in the case study outlined above, all of these proposed 
conditions would have reduced the value of the MSS spectrum.43  For this 
 
 37.  Sprint Nextel Comments to the MSS NPRM at 11; U.S. Cellular Comments to the MSS 
NPRM at 5–6; MSS NPRM, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 42-43, 137–147. 
 38.  See e.g., Letter from DISH to FCC, WT Docket No. 12-70 (Aug. 21, 2012).  
 39.  DISH Reply Comments to the MSS NPRM at 28–29. 
 40.  See e.g., In the Matter of Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2000-2020 
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Bands Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at 
1525-1559 MHz and 1626.5- 1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and 2000-2020 
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-
2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands (Letter from DISH to FCC), WT Docket No. 
12-70 (August 21, 2012); DISH Reply Comments supra note 14, at 24–29. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Vigorish, or the “vig,” is the amount charged by a bookmaker for its services.  
 43.  However, we emphasize again that this pattern of value extraction is not unique to the 
DISH transaction.  In nearly every license transfer of significance, the FCC imposes conditions on 
the transaction.  See Koutsky and Spiwak, supra note 9; Beard et al., Eroding the Rule of Law, 
supra note 9.  Indeed, it is important to recognize that our critiques do not go to whether the FCC’s 
should play a role in reviewing communications industry “mergers” broadly, but rather to the way 
the agency conducts one of its core missions as the so-called “expert agency”:  spectrum 
repurposing and relicensing. 
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reason, it is not difficult to see why firms with spectrum holdings are 
reluctant to bring its spectrum to the secondary market, even if the next best 
option is to let the spectrum lay fallow or be grossly underutilized.  Indeed, 
some of the proposals outlined above nakedly sought to have the government 
use its coercive power to confiscate large portions of the spectrum resources 
involved in the deal.  By its actions — whether proposing, implementing, or 
even entertaining such conditions — the FCC sends a signal to those wanting 
to trade or alter licenses:  when you bring your spectrum to the agency, be 
prepared to “pay the vig.”  As is standard, taxing an activity leads to less of 
it, and we conclude that the lack of a robust secondary market for spectrum 
in the U.S. is related, in part if not mostly, to the potential for taxing (i.e., 
conditioning) valuable transactions when reviewing and approving license 
transfers.  The considerable delay and uncertainty resulting from prolonged 
FCC proceedings only act as an additional “tax.”  The theoretical 
implications are demonstrated below. 
III. An Economic Framework for Secondary Market 
Transactions 
Our economic analysis springs from a basic observation that motivates 
most discussions of broadband policy in the United States today: the amount 
of spectrum available for commercial applications in fast growing, high 
value applications such as mobile broadband services is increasingly 
inadequate to meet the demands for these services.  This situation can only 
be expected to get worse, barring a significant addition to spectrum 
availability through reassignment of public spectrum, or else some important 
technical improvement. Thus, spectrum forms a limitational input in the 
production of mobile data services.  The amount of services that may be 
provided can be limited by the available amount of spectrum, in the same 
way as the diameter of a pipeline can practically limit the amount of water 
that can be pumped from one location to another.  Although one can imagine 
technical upgrades that may substitute for spectrum over some limited range, 
the existence of such means will not change our basic story, although such 
extensions greatly complicate the model.44  Thus, we restrict our attention 
here to the extreme case of spectrum availability as an absolute capacity limit 
for the production of the relevant services. 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Mobile Broadband: The Benefits of Additional 
Spectrum, OBI Tech. Paper No. 6, 6–10 (Oct. 2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc 
-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadband-benefits-ofadditional-spectrum.pdf. 
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In order to make the point as simple as possible, we will examine the 
basic problem of allocating a finite amount of spectrum between two 
economic markets, A and B.45 While products A and B both require spectrum 
to “produce,” the two products are not substitutes or complements to one 
another, so that their demands can be taken to be independent.  This 
assumption is also not critical, and serves to simplify what follows.  The 
production of services A and B is assumed to require precisely one unit of 
capacity per unit produced.  We ignore other inputs and assume, again for 
simplicity, that the marginal costs are zero, since the inclusion of positive, 
constant marginal costs and alternative fixed input requirement ratios is an 
unimportant complication. 
Our goals in what follows are to illustrate the consequences of the 
spectrum constraint on the welfare properties of the private allocation of 
spectrum (i.e., that which occurs sans regulatory intervention), and to show 
how the presence of a spectrum constraint makes the general policy of 
pursuing social or other goals via restrictions on the transfer of necessary 
inputs an inefficient approach in general.  As discussed above, to achieve 
this we will interpret the potential regulatory intervention into the 
reassignment of spectrum as an implicit tax on the transaction, since costly 
requirements imposed on transfers have the effect of raising the costs of the 
spectrum transfer to the participants.  Thus, the notion of a tax on input 
transfers will provide us with a simple and general means for evaluating 
spectrum regulation, which avoids the necessity of considering the specific 
form the regulatory requirements might take.  For example, if regulators 
required firms wishing to trade spectrum to build out their networks to serve 
areas that are uneconomic from the firms’ points of view, then the 
requirement — which might have other, noneconomic benefits in the 
regulators’ calculus — affects the firm as would a tax on the transaction. 
Using this generalization, we can obtain results relevant to virtually any 
costly requirement. 
Although all economic resources are, by definition, “scarce,” radio 
spectrum is scarce in a somewhat more profound sense in the information 
technology markets than is, say, labor or equipment.  By giving up something 
else, society can provide more workers or capital for the production of 
mobile Internet service.  In contrast, spectrum used in this process is assigned 
by law and the availability of technically useful frequencies is seriously 
constrained by the laws of physics.  Many markets in the United States are 
 
45.    The transfer may be either intra- or inter-firm, though we contemplate in our model an intra-
firm transfer by a monopolist in an effort to assess the effect of market power on incentives. 
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confronting “spectrum exhaust,” and network performance degradation is 
already observed in some areas.46  While technical means for using existing 
licensed spectrum more efficiently are under active investigation, few 
observers suggest this effort will solve the problem of the crowded airwaves 
in the near or intermediate terms.47  Moreover, the strong interest of many 
firms in acquiring additional spectrum is evidence of the spectrum 
shortage.48  Our analysis takes this circumstance as a primary assumption, 
and our model is applicable only to circumstances in which output is 
constrained in some relevant sense. 
A.  The Formal Model 
To begin, suppose that a fixed resource (“spectrum”) can be allocated 
to serve two markets: A and B.  Let QA and QB denote the quantity of 
spectrum allocated to each market, and let the total amount of spectrum be 
denoted by S, so that QA + QB = S.  As mentioned above, we will assume that 
a unit of spectrum will be transformed into a standard unit of output in both 
markets, so that the outputs produced, also denoted QA and QB, must satisfy 
QA + QB ≤ S.  Because our interest is in those situations in which output is 
constrained by available spectrum, we will ignore (for now) the case in 
which spectrum allocated to either market is allowed to lay fallow.  We will, 
 
 46.  Indeed, there is already mounting anecdotal evidence that firms are responding to 
spectrum constraints with price to ration available capacity.  See, e.g., AT&T, Rate Increase for 
Legacy Unlimited Smartphone Data Plans, AT&T SUPPORT (last visited Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html?source=EC1N0000000wvc00D&wtExtndSource=un
ltdata#!/wireless/KM1064176; Mike Dano, Sprint to Raise Price of Unlimited Data Plan From 
$60/Month to $70/Month Starting Oct. 16, FIERCEWIRELESS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.fierce 
wireless.com/story/sprint-raise-price-unlimited-data-plan-60month-70month-starting-oct16/2015-
09-30; David Goldman, T-Mobile Hikes Price of Unlimited Plans by $15, CNN (Nov. 11, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/11/technology/tmobile-unlimited-plans; Jose Pagliery, Verizon to 
Add $20 to Grandfathered Unlimited Data Plans, CNN (Oct. 8, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://money. 
cnn.com/2015/10/08/technology/verizon-unlimited-plan-increase.   
 47.  Locke, supra note 4; see also Liz Klimas, Running Out of Radio Waves? Mobile Carriers 
Think So But Others Say Just Improve Technology, THE BLAZE (Apr. 18, 2012, 1:30 AM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/running-out-of-radio-waves-mobile-carriers-think-so-but-others-
say-just-improve-technology; 10 Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, AMDOCS 
(2012), http://www.amdocs.com/Whitepapers/OSS/WhitePaper-MobileDataCapacity 
Crunch.pdf; Richard Bennett, Powering the Mobile Revolution:  Principles of Spectrum Allocation, 
INFO. AND TECH. FOUND. (Jul. 31, 2012), http://www.itif.org/publications/powering-mobile-
revolution-principles-spectrum-allocation. 
 48.  See, e.g., In re AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. For Consent To Assign Licenses and 
Authorizations, WT Docket No. 11-18, Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 17589 (released Dec. 22, 2011); 
Cellco, supra note 8. 
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however, have a bit more to say about this assumption below.  We also 
normalize the marginal production costs to zero for both goods. 
We will examine, in turn, the spectrum allocation problems of the 
socially conscious regulator and a monopoly, for-profit firm (which exposes 
the consequences of market power most clearly).  For simplicity, we assume 
the monopolist is repurposing its own spectrum rather than buying or selling 
spectrum to an unrelated party.  We will characterize the socially optimal 
allocation of spectrum between the two markets, and compare this allocation 
with that which would arise under a monopoly or cartel provider 
environment.  Our interest focuses on when and how these allocations might 
differ, and the source of those differences.  As will be seen, asymmetries 
between the two markets create incentives for both the regulator and the firm 
to adjust their spectrum allocations.  However, the natures of those 
asymmetries are relevant for the solutions of these problems, and we 
consider two cases of demand asymmetry as a result.  These two cases are, 
in turn, motivated by two primary ways in which one market could differ 
from the other.  First, one market might contain customers highly similar to 
those in another market, but more of them.  In this case, the market demands 
will differ by their slopes (a rotation of demand on its axis), but not their 
price intercepts, a consequence of aggregating the demands of similar agents.  
In contrast, one market could offer a product of higher marginal value than 
another, so that the willingness to pay of consumers for units of spectrum-
derived service differs by some positive amount.  In this case, the demands 
might have the same slopes, but one would be above the other, having a 
higher price intercept (a parallel shift in demand).49  For those that do not 
wish to carefully study the derivation of the model, a numerical example 
based on the theory is provided in Subsection F below. 
B.  Allocating Spectrum Across Markets 
Let the market demands for A and B be given by: 
AA aQMP    (1) 
BB bQMP   (2) 
where M is the common willingness-to-pay intercept and a, b are the slope 
parameters.  The social planner who sought to maximize welfare would 
 
 49.  In reality the relationships between the demands will be more complex than this, but we 
are only looking to establish the point at issue. 
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allocate the scarce spectrum across the two markets in order to maximize 
consumer surplus alone, since production is costless by assumption.  (The 
social planner maximizes consumer and producer surplus, but we have 
assumed zero producer surplus in this case.  The monopolist maximizes 
profits, thus leading to a different objective function relative to the social 
planner.)  Formally, the social planner solves: 





   BA
BA
Q
B
Q
AQQ
dQQPdQQP
00
,
)()(max   (3) 
such that QA + QB = S. The first-order condition for this constrained 
maximization problem yields the basic characterization that the social 
planner would attempt to equate prices in the two markets: 
)()( eBB
e
AA QPQP  . (4) 
The price-equality result is intuitive and quite standard, although it appears 
novel because of the nature of the constraint.  This condition implies that the 
regulators should allocate scarce spectrum to make the marginal rate of 
substitution (“MRS”) equal for consumers across both markets.  If the MRS 
(between the goods produced by spectrum and a numéraire good) were not 
equal, further repurposing would improve aggregate surplus.  Thus, if one 
market is different than the other, the regulator would allocate spectrum to 
produce price equality between them. 
Combined with the spectrum constraint, this result yields the socially 
efficient allocation of spectrum for market B: 
ba
aSQeB  . (5) 
Suppose, however, that the allocation of spectrum was left in the hands of a 
for profit-maximizing monopoly firm?  Would the allocation of spectrum by 
the monopoly differ from that of the social planner?  To answer this question, 
we consider the monopoly problem associated with the demand system and 
the resource constraint above: 
 
 BBAAQQ QPQPBA ,max such that SQQ BA  . (6) 
The first-order condition implies: 
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** 22 BA bQaQ  . (7) 
Hence, the monopoly firm would allocate the scarce spectrum in the same 
manner as the social planner: 
ba
aSQB 
* , (8) 
which can be seen by comparing Expression (8) and (5).  This result 
illustrates an important point, although it is derived in a special setting.  In 
the presence of a binding spectrum constraint, the ordinary differences 
between profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing behavior are 
attenuated. This occurs precisely because of the constraint. 50   We will 
examine this tendency further below. 
 
C.  Reallocating Spectrum after Changes in Market Conditions:  Rotating 
Demand Curves 
In the practical world, supply and demand conditions are always 
changing.  Thus, allocating spectrum is not a “once and for all” problem, and 
the challenge confronting the industry and its regulators is to make 
adjustments in their business plans and rules as markets and technology 
evolves.  This is obviously a difficult problem.  Consider, for example, the 
response of the regulator and the monopoly to a change in the size (number 
of customers) in market B, say.  In this case, a simple representation of 
demands is given by demand curves with differing slopes, but the same 
intercept.  Graphically, the demand curve rotates on its price axis.  How 
would the social planner and the monopoly firm respond? 
Let us suppose that there is an increase in the size (the number of 
consumers) in market B, so that bb ~ : 
BB QbMP
~~  . (9) 
The social planner would increase the spectrum allocation to the growing 
market as follows: 
e
B
e
B Qba
aSQ  ~
~ . (10) 
 
 50.  See also Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, supra note 1.   
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Thus, the socially conscious regulator responds to market growth by 
allocating more spectrum to the larger market, at the expense of the relatively 
smaller market. 
Unsurprisingly, the monopoly would follow suit, reallocating spectrum 
to the larger market from the smaller market.  The resulting allocation is: 
*~~
B
e
B QQ  , (11) 
so the monopolist acts in precisely the same way as the social planner.  So, 
while FCC intervention and conditioning of spectrum license transfers is 
sometimes defended on the grounds that it is a response to market power in 
some wireless markets, at least in the circumstances assumed here economic 
theory does not provide justification for regulation of this sort. Under 
spectrum exhaust, the benevolent regulator and the monopoly (or cartel) 
allocate spectrum in the same way.  As such, market power (even in the 
extreme case assumed here) is not a basis for interfering with efforts to 
attenuate spectrum exhaust through private-sector efforts at spectrum 
repurposing. 
D.  FCC Review and the Taxation of Secondary Market Transactions 
FCC restrictions and conditions on spectrum repurposing take many 
forms, as discussed above.  For our purposes, such policies can be abstractly 
represented as taxes on the transfers of spectrum assets.  We wish to examine 
the consequences of taxes of this sort on the welfare properties of the 
allocation of spectrum when there is market power, i.e., monopoly. 
Suppose market A is stagnating, but market B is growing (a change 
captured as shown in Expression 9).  As we just demonstrated, the monopoly 
wishes to transfer spectrum from A to B in order to capitalize on the higher 
returns available in B.  The regulator, however, imposes restrictions on this 
activity which we represent as a tax t imposed on the quantity of spectrum 
transferred (i.e., a per megahertz fee).  In other words, the firm faces a higher 
tax bill as it tries to repurpose more spectrum.  The monotonic relationship 
between the firm’s tax liability and the size of the spectrum transferred 
appears to us to be quite realistic in the context of the history of such disputes 
at the Commission.51 
With a linear tax, the firm’s problem would be: 
 
 51.  Nearly any form of taxation on the deal will create a disincentive to the transaction.  That 
said, one particular form of “taxation” may have a more or less pernicious effect than others.   
3 BEARD ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NN_NW_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
202 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
 
 tQRQR BAA  )(~)(max ** ,  (12) 
R denotes the total revenue function (price times quantity) and Δ is the 
amount of spectrum moved from A to B.  The first-order condition for the 
firm’s maximization problem is given by: 
0)(~2)(2 **  tQbQa BA . (13) 
Solving for the optimal amount of spectrum to shift from market A to the 
growing market B: 
ba
tQbaQ BA
~
2/~~ **

 . (14) 
Thus, we can see that the tax imposed on the repurposing of spectrum 
reduces the amount of spectrum that the firm will shift to the growing market.  
When t > 0, 
e
BBB QQtQ
~~)(~ **  . (15) 
A positive tax rate will therefore make the amount of spectrum shifted 
towards market B less than it is socially optimal.  Plainly, if the Commission 
wants to increase the amount of spectrum allocated to mobile data use, then 
levying taxes on transactions that make such transfers is precisely the wrong 
policy. 
E.  An Alternative Demand Specification 
The analysis given above uses a particular sort of demand asymmetry 
— that of similar markets of different sizes — and it is important to 
determine the extent to which the findings are dependent on that 
specification.  To that end, we now turn briefly to a parallel analysis using 
our alternative description of the demand differences between A and B.   For 
brevity, we skip the intermediate steps and proceed immediately to the 
analysis of how the monopoly owner and the social planner would reallocate 
spectrum as market B expands. 
Consider a case in which the growth in market B is due to an increase 
in consumer valuations of the product in question, rather than to an increase 
in the number of consumers.  Graphically, this is represented by a parallel 
shift in the demand curve.  We can model this alternate situation by 
increasing the intercept of the demand curve, so that :~ MM   
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BB bQMP  ~~ . (16) 
The social planner would increase the spectrum allocation to the growing 
market as follows: 
e
B
e
B Qba
MMaSQ 
 )
~(~ . (17) 
This condition once again can be interpreted as assuring equal marginal rates 
of substitution across markets A and B. 
What, though, of the monopoly or cartelized industry?  Left to its own 
devices and profit motives, a monopoly would also increase the spectrum 
allocated to the growing market, but in this case, would not go as far as the 
social planner. 
e
BB Qba
MMaSQ ~)
~(5.0~ * 
 . (18) 
Here we observe a difference between the social planner and the for-profit 
firm in the allocation decision.  In this case, the difference arises because of 
the nature of the differences between market demands under this 
specification.  In particular, unlike the “scaling” case considered before, here 
the monopoly reallocates too little spectrum to the growing market.  This is 
a consequence of double marginalization.  Under uniform prices, the 
monopoly is unable to capture all of the additional value available in market 
B.  Thus, it is “under-motivated” to reallocate spectrum in this case. 
In this case, the monopoly under-allocates spectrum (from a social 
welfare perspective) to the growing market (even in the absence of a tax).  If 
the FCC imposed a tax on the firm for repurposing spectrum, then the firm 
would be pushed even further away from the social optimum: 
ba
tMM

 2/)
~(5.0~  (19) 
A positive tax rate will clearly further reduce the amount of spectrum shifted 
towards the growing market and cause an even greater social welfare loss. 
It is easy to overlook the significance of these results from the 
conceptual point of view.  It is true that market power will lead to an 
allocation of spectrum that is inefficient compared to that selected by the 
social planner.  However, the monopoly will under allocate spectrum to the 
growing market.  While this result arises in this particular model, a little 
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reflection suggests it is likely to be fairly common in other models: the 
problem with monopoly (or other concentrated market forms) is that they 
produce too little.  But with spectrum as limitational on output, that suggests 
they will seek to reallocate too little spectrum. Yet, the FCC policy in its 
license transfer process is to tax, i.e., to discourage the transfers.  If the 
problem the FCC worries about is market power leading firms to behave 
inconsistently with the public welfare, then it would be more sensible for the 
agency to use its regulatory powers to encourage repurposing of spectrum; 
not tax or prohibit it.  Despite its desire to repurpose spectrum for mobile 
broadband, the FCC’s policies have the consequence of preventing 
repurposing of spectrum to more highly valued uses. 
F.  Numerical Example 
A numerical example can be used to illustrate the workings of the 
theoretical model.  Consider the very simple initial setup: 
AA QP  12 ; (20) 
BB QP  12 ; (21) 
12 BA QQ ; (22) 
There are 12 units of spectrum to be allocated between the two markets, A 
and B.  It is straightforward to check that social planner and the firm would 
both equally split the scarce spectrum (from Expression 5 and 8): 
6**  BAeBeA QQQQ . (23) 
Using the demand specification from Section III.E, now suppose we increase 
consumer valuation in market B so that the intercept of the demand curve 
rises from 12 to 20: 
BB QP  20~ . (24) 
From Expressions (18) and (20), we see that the social planner will shift more 
spectrum to the growing market compared to the profit-maximizing firm: 
*~810~ B
e
B QQ  . (25) 
So, in the absence of regulation, the private firm shifts too little spectrum to 
the growing market relative to the socially optimal repurposing.  This lack 
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of incentive is enhanced if the FCC imposes a tax rate on the repurposing of 
spectrum (say, t = 4).  Now, by Expression (19), the firm’s optimal 
repurposing is only one unit: 
1~  . (26) 
If the tax is levied, then the private firm would provide the growing market 
B with only seven units of spectrum.  The reduction from eight to seven units 
in market B generates a social surplus loss of twelve and a half units.  
Keeping five units instead of four in market A generates a social surplus gain 
of only seven and a half units.  Hence, there would be a net societal loss of 
five units due to the FCC tax.  This is a very expensive tax in the sense that 
while obtaining four units of tax revenue from the firm, the tax on the 
transaction robs society (the firm and consumers) of an additional five units 
of value. 
IV. Policy Implications 
The analysis above is abstract and very simplified, but its policy 
implications are nonetheless numerous and important.  We can summarize 
some of the insights provided by the analysis as follows.  To begin, the 
analysis shows, unsurprisingly, that when values differ across uses or 
markets, both a social planner and the private firm will seek to reallocate (at 
least some of the) spectrum to the higher valued use.  The private firm will 
allocate an amount less than or equal to the social planner.  This result 
suggests that if the regulator wants spectrum moved to a higher valued use 
like mobile broadband, then the activity, if anything, should be encouraged.  
Yet, as detailed here, imposing conditions on such transfers can sensibly be 
viewed as a tax on the repurposing.  As is well established by economic 
theory, and demonstrated here in this particular instance, such “taxation” will 
result in less spectrum being reallocated to the higher valued use.  Thus, 
imposing conditions on efforts to repurpose spectrum is precisely the wrong 
the policy, as such conditions shrink rather than encourage the incentive of 
firms to reallocate spectrum to mobile broadband (or any other higher valued 
service).  Layering on administrative delays and uncertainties further inhibit 
secondary market transactions and other repurposing. 
In addition, the use of the license transfer authority to impose taxes on 
repurposing can be expected to alter the type of transactions that arise.  Some 
license transfers are of a trivial nature, and may involve players that do not 
draw the attention of those seeking to use the process as a mechanism for 
rent extraction.  Larger transfers, or transfers involving significant parties 
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including the more successful mobile providers, are prime targets for 
exploitation.  As a result, taxation by condition will discourage the larger 
scale transactions necessary to resolve spectrum exhaust from arising in the 
secondary market, though we may still observe many deals of a less material 
nature.52  As a result, spectrum exhaust continues, and society is worse off.  
Moreover, we cannot and do not today observe what an unregulated, freely 
functioning market for spectrum looks like, and probably will not in the 
future as long as the license transfer process involves heavy taxation.  There 
are likely many transactions that would create significant value to society 
that do not manifest for fear of the imposition of value-extracting conditions. 
As a practical matter, it may not be possible for the Commission to pre-
commit to frictionless repurposing of spectrum resources, though such pre-
commitment would greatly improve the functioning of the secondary market.  
The Agency’s past decisions often (though not always) serve as a guide for 
future policy.  In an effort to improve matters, the agency could, either 
formally or informally, limit the influence of proposed conditions by 
establishing boundaries on what will and will not be considered.  Consider, 
for example, former FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s  rejection (in 
2012) of efforts to limit usage-based pricing for broadband services.53  While 
the Commission did not formally issue an order or decision precluding the 
agency from considering limits on usage-based pricing, he was unequivocal 
in his public statements that the agency would treat usage-based pricing as a 
legitimate practice. 54   In the case of spectrum, the Commission or its 
Chairman could signal to commenters that the repurposing of spectrum to 
mobile broadband is of significant importance and the agency will consider 
only conditions narrowly tailored to address specific, documented, and 
 
 52.  Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 11.  Many observed secondary market deals are the 
consequence of FCC requirements to divest or sell spectrum assets. 
 53.  Yinka Adegoke, FCC Chief Backs Usage-Based Internet Pricing, REUTERS (May 22, 
2012, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/22/net-us-cableshow-fcc-idUSBRE84L1 
4J20120522. 
 54.  See FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski Prepared Remarks to International CTIA 
Wireless 2012 New Orleans (May 8, 2012), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-313945A1.pdf (“We’ve also been clear since 2010 that, in a competitive market, usage-based 
pricing can be a useful tool — consistent with the goal of driving efficiency, as well as with the 
need for return on investment to drive capital expenditures in robust network infrastructure.”); see 
also Joe Flint, FCC Chairman Genachowski on Board with Usage Pricing for Broadband, L.A. 
TIMES (May 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/22/entertainment/la-et-ct-fcc-
20120522 (“Usage-based pricing could be a healthy and beneficial part of the ecosystem” and that 
a tiered pricing approach may “increase consumer choice and competition” and “result in lower 
prices for people who consume less broadband.”). 
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solvable problems arising from a license transfer or adjustment. 55   The 
Commission could likewise commit to resolving proposals to repurpose 
spectrum on a more expedited and defined schedule.  While the 
unconditioned repurposing of MSS spectrum was good policy, the decision 
took sixteen months to render, including seven month delay to issue an 
NPRM following the application.  There is clearly room for improvement. 
Our analysis also says something about what one might call the 
“monopolization narrative.”  The fear of some observers seems to be that the 
sale or transfer of spectrum to certain firms or for certain uses will result in 
a change in market structure, which is undesirable.  Some of the conditions 
in the DISH case outlined above appear to be motivated by such concerns.  
Under spectrum exhaust, such concerns are of limited concern.  If output is 
constrained before and after the sale, then any changes in market structure 
induced by the sale of spectrum will be irrelevant to the outcome:  the 
industry will sell “all it can” at the “highest price it can get.”  Yet, that 
“highest price” will be lower than otherwise because the amount of capacity 
has increased.56  Economic theory suggests that markets operating in input 
constrained environments present far less antitrust risk than do conventional 
markets.  The mere presence of the binding constraints decouples firm 
behavior, and welfare performance, from market structure.  The application 
of the “usual” structural analysis to these markets is hazardous.  Put bluntly, 
the Commission and all interested parties need to modify their views of 
industry structure to accommodate spectrum shortages.57 
With regard to the market power consequences of a transaction, it is 
also worth considering the source of the spectrum resource being reallocated.  
The existence of “slack” capacity in the “small” market strengthens our 
conclusions since, in that case, the removal of spectrum from the slack 
market is virtually costless from a societal standpoint, and its repositioning 
in the constrained market will put downward pressure on prices.  This effort 
 
 55.  See Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 9; see also Larry Spiwak, Curbing the FCC’s Ability 
to Impose “Voluntary” Merger Commitments . . ., PHOENIX CENTER LAW AND ECONOMICS BLOG 
(Mar. 6, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://phoenix-center.org/blog/archives/490. 
 56.  See Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, supra note 1; see also, T. 
Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, Testing for Collusion During Periods of Input Supply 
Disruptions: The Case of Allocations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 213 (2000); Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz 
& Philip. Crooke, Bertrand Competition with Capacity Constraints: Mergers Among Parking 
Lots, 113 J. ECONOMETRICS 49 (2003); Arturs Kalnins, Luke M. Froeb & Steven Tschantz, Mergers 
Increase Output When Firms Compete by Managing Revenue, VAND. L. & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER 
NO. 10-27 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670278. 
 57.  Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, id.; see also Beard, et al., 
A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile Communications, supra note 22. 
3 BEARD ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NN_NW_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:08 PM 
208 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
 
to increase capacity in constrained markets is apparent in efforts to transition 
MSS, WCS and broadcast spectrum to mobile broadband usage.  In contrast, 
the movement of spectrum from a very tight, growing market, to a loose one, 
is hard to rationalize outside of some strategic plan that involves tightening 
capacity still further in an already tight market environment.  Certainly, 
arguments for limits on repurposing to constrained markets from loose 
markets contradicts the arguments, usually made by the same groups, that 
some carriers are attempting to create artificial scarcity.  Indeed, it is the 
proposals to tax the movement of spectrum to constrained markets that create 
scarcity. 
We suspect that some will argue that the Commission imposes 
conditions on transactions in furtherance of some goal, social or otherwise, 
so that the benefits from obtaining these goals offset the harms from taxation.  
However, basic economics indicates that taxes affect the marginal benefits 
or costs of activities and can result in inefficient levels of those activities.  
The problem here, however, is three-fold. 
First, taxes can be high enough so that little or no spectrum repurposing 
occurs.  In this case, there is no hypothetical revenue associated with the tax, 
and the regulator prevents efficient repurposing of spectrum in return for 
nothing.  We have assumed a monopoly or cartel structure so far, so the 
problem is not ameliorated by market power among the sellers — even if the 
industry is cartelized, taxing repurposing of a constraining input is 
inefficient. 
Second, the taxation of spectrum movements, rather than spectrum or 
customers generally, is inherently a bad idea because the only cases in which 
the regulation is imposed are precisely those in which spectrum is being 
moved from less to more valued uses.  It is when one market is growing, or 
when a new device or application is introduced, that there is the greatest 
private incentive to repurpose spectrum.  There is no general reason to 
suppose that, under spectrum exhaust, the motives of private firms and the 
regulator need be incompatible. 
Third, if spectrum allocated to market A does not bind the output of 
firms in market A (so spectrum is not scarce in A at equilibrium), the policy 
of “taxing” a spectrum transfer to market B becomes even worse.  Because 
A is not constrained, a marginal repurposing of spectrum from A to B will 
cost society nothing in market A.  On the other hand, the additional spectrum 
in market B will, under virtually any reasonable scenario, reduce prices in B.  
The existence of spectrum assets allowed to lie fallow suggests this grossly 
inefficient scenario is not merely theoretical. 
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In sum, the usefulness of policies actively discouraging transfers of 
spectrum from less to more valued uses are very counterproductive.  If the 
purpose of these impediments to a secondary market is to correct 
inefficiencies due to market power, then that purpose is misplaced.  If the 
purpose is to prevent the exercise of market power, then that purpose is also 
misplaced.  If the purpose is to use the regulatory leverage of the 
Commission to pressure private firms to unilaterally fund social projects, 
then the means chosen are grossly inefficient, and the fairness of the entire 
enterprise is problematic. 
V. Conclusion 
Increasingly, it appears that solutions to spectrum exhaust must come, 
in large part, from the private sector in the form of secondary market 
transactions or other spectrum repurposing.  Such transactions, however, 
require government blessing in the form of FCC approval of license transfers 
or modifications.  By the agency’s own admission, this approval process is 
an impediment to the functioning of a secondary market.58  As such, the 
agency concluded that “[m]ore flexible spectrum rights will help ensure that 
spectrum moves to more productive uses, including mobile broadband, 
through voluntary market mechanisms.” 59   Yet, despite these clear 
statements of intent, the FCC has been slow to enact policies that would 
contribute to the creation of an effective and efficient large-scale secondary 
market for commercial spectrum. 
In this article, we show that when the regulatory process is used to “tax” 
efforts to repurpose spectrum with burdensome conditions, these taxes 
reduce the incentive for firms to engage in secondary market transactions 
and thus impede market-based solutions for spectrum exhaust.  Accordingly, 
our article suggests that if the Commission is serious about alleviating 
spectrum exhaust and promoting a vibrant large-scale secondary market for 
commercial spectrum, then the agency should expeditiously approve efforts 
to repurpose spectrum without extraneous conditions, barring legitimate 
competitive or interference concerns. 
 
 58.  In its National Broadband Plan, the agency admitted that the “current spectrum policy 
framework sometimes impedes the free flow of spectrum to its most highly valued uses.”  Indeed, 
the FCC specifically noted that “legacy ‘command and control’ rules, high transaction costs, and 
highly fragmented license regimes sometimes preserve outmoded band plans and prevent the 
aggregation (or disaggregation) of spectrum into more valuable license configurations.”  National 
Broadband Plan, supra note 1, at 78–79. 
 59.  Id. 
